Síria: Panorama econòmic
Syria has been plagued by a devastating war since 2011. According to a study published by the World Bank, the conflict caused a cumulative GDP loss of about USD 226 billion only between 2011 and 2016, about four times Syria’s pre-war GDP, and the humanitarian crisis has claimed more than 600,000 victims. Beyond the immediate impact of the conflict, the economy suffers from the compounding effects of adverse weather events, regional fragility, and macroeconomic instability. However, it is extremely difficult to assess the financial health of the country as the wartime GDP can be very unstable due to foreign aid and continued destruction. The return of several provinces under the control of the Bashar Al-Assad regime was expected to restore certain stability necessary for the start of reconstruction and economic recovery; however, the Lebanese crisis, the new sanctions imposed by the United States (extended in 2024) and the earthquake that shook the country in February 2023 resulting in a total estimated impact of USD 5.2 billion, further deteriorated the situation. The latest Syria Economic Monitor, published before the earthquake, pointed to a GDP contraction of 3.2% in 2023, following a 3.5% decline in 2022. Inflation was expected to decrease but persist at elevated levels throughout 2023, driven by exchange rate pass-through, ongoing shortages of food and fuel, and additional reductions in subsidies.
With the help of his Russian and Iranian allies, Bashar Al-Assad has regained control of most of the Syrian territory and considers himself victorious in an essentially ended war. But the country is in ruins, the destruction of the physical capital being estimated at around USD 120 billion, and the estimated loss in GDP at nearly 325 billion USD (UNESCWA). Overall, the estimates of reconstruction costs of Syria’s productive capacity range between USD 250 billion to 400 billion (Coface); nevertheless, the long-awaited reconstruction does not materialize. Since the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, macroeconomic conditions have significantly worsened. With almost half of the oil consumption and approximately one-third of cereal consumption imported, elevated commodity prices resulting from the Ukrainian conflict have eroded fiscal and external standings while driving inflation. The surge in prices for essential goods has prompted a more stringent fiscal policy. The already precarious situation of Syrian households has escalated, as reflected in heightened vulnerability. This rise in vulnerability has coincided with an uptick in labour force participation, particularly among workers on the fringes of the labour market, including women, youth, and the elderly, who face limited earning prospects. Meanwhile, government spending continued to be constrained by low revenues and the lack of access to financing. The current account of Syria is expected to remain firmly in deficit because of a high trade deficit, contributing to the drain of foreign exchange reserves.
On the humanitarian level, the situation is catastrophic. About 13 million people have been internally displaced and 6.7 million are officially registered as refugees (World Bank). The social situation of the country was already serious before the crisis: a third of the population lived below the poverty line, unemployment affected 20% of the population (75% of the unemployed were aged 15 to 24) and the demographic growth rate was very high (3.3% per year). Since the start of the war, the situation has only gotten worse. Essential goods and services, including food, clothing, housing, and fuel, account for about three-fourths of the consumption basket, with food alone accounting for about 40% of consumption. According to the World Food Program, 12.4 million Syrians are now food insecure, almost 60% of the country’s population. Moreover, Syria’s working-age population has significantly shrunk, particularly in its male component; however, the impact of this demographic shock has been partly compensated by an increase in labour force participation.
GDP Indicators | 2022 | 2023 (E) | 2024 (E) | 2025 (E) | 2026 (E) |
GDP (billions USD) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
GDP (constant prices, annual % change) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
GDP per capita (USD) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
General government gross debt (in % of GDP) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
Inflation rate (%) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
Unemployment rate (% of the labor force) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
Current Account (billions USD) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Current account (in % of GDP) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
Font: IMF – World Economic Outlook Database, 2016
Note: (e) Estimated data
Monetary indicators | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
Syrian Pound (SYP) - Average annual exchange rate for 1 EUR | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
2015
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Actualitzacions: March 2024